On the ontological Basis of Karl Marx’s philosophy
Wu Xiaoming
Abstract: “Sensuous
activity” or “objective (gegenstandliche) activity” is the pivot in the
ontological basis of Marx’s philosophy. Marx’s philosophy reveals a pre-conceptual,
pre-logical, and pre-reflective world, presents the original relationship
between man and nature, completely overthrows Platonism and ends all metaphysics
by exceeding the epistemological approach. Marx’s philosophy constitutes a brand-new
horizon of philosophical revolution, and starts an ontological approach of
philosophy, which vividly proves that it has exceeded the frame of modern
philosophy and is a kind of contemporary philosophy.
Key words: Mark’s philosophy ontology contemporary meaning ontological approach objectified (gegenstandliche) activity
The contemporary nature of Karl Marx’s philosophy is essentially involved with the ontological foundation. The philosophical revolution initiated by Marx on this foundation does not only specifically transcend Hegel’s philosophy and Feuerbach’s philosophy, but generally overthrows whole Platonism, in other words, completely ends whole metaphysics. However, because people are universally limited their notions to the vision of modern times, or put Marx’s philosophy into the philosophical frame of modern times to understand and explain, the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy is made obscure and the deepest revolutionary meaning ever undergoing in the fundamental area is made extremely limited. In that situation, the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy seems to have been decomposed into various ‘factors’ and ‘reconstructed’ in the philosophical framework of modern times according to different proportions of those factors. Philosophy reconstructed in this way might seemingly retain its radical and critical appearance but inevitably and fatefully experience a series of processes of internal retraction.
This kind of retractions lead by the breakup of the foundation is often seen in the whole 20th century. This is true when Mehring fulfilled the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy with mechanical materialism and mended the foundation by introducing some Fichte’s factors and Schopenhauer’s ‘shiners’. It is also true when Plechanow retreated to positivism and rational metaphysics with great strides and supplemented it with external dialectics again and again. Lukács ever tried totally to change ‘Mehring-Plechanow’s tradition’, the foundation of internal retreat and external combination, but was still enclosed in Hegel’s paradigm. Though in doing so he could provide the best interpretive scheme in the sphere of modern times, the sphere itself, as a secret and potentiality, includes that kind of degenerate and dreary ontological patterns in his late works.
We have no intention to negate or devaluate the historical deeds of those figures. As critics, they stood head and shoulders above all others in their ages. Nevertheless, if their criticisms were still limited to the sphere of modernity, if the ontological foundation of their criticisms were still obscure and broken, this kind of criticisms had to draw back in theory as if they were definitely lonely in practice. Erich Fromm, known as ‘the greatest dreamer in 20th century’, the radical intensity of whose social criticism can be compared with his romanticist utopianism, established some equivalents of ‘religious factors’ and ‘value factors’ only in opposition to so-called Marx’s theory understood as ‘knowledge science’ and ‘positive science’.
So it is necessary to re-discuss and re-examine the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy under contemporary conditions after the undergoing of the philosophy of 20th century. The importance of the foundation lies in: it has maintained and fortified the principle height of whole Marx’s theory, and only at this principle height can we most definitely disclose the contemporary meaning of Marx’s philosophy and check various efforts in the approach to return to modernity.
1. Does Marx’s philosophy belong to
pre-Kant or post-Hegel ?
Here what we try to demonstrate is the basic difference in philosophical quality which has nothing to do with time consequences. Few people deny following saying: Marx’s philosophy belongs to post-Hegel rather than pre-Kant. It is one thing to admit this Orally but it is another thing to give out a real and exact exposition. In the discussion of the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy, it is essential to distinguish ‘oral decorations’ from the inner solid contents constituting main principles. In this way of thinking, we have to acknowledge that the ontological foundation of Marx’s Philosophy is often considered as pre-Kant and only in better circumstances is it interpreted as post-Hegel.
Theorists in Second International are representatives treating the ontological foundation of Marx’s Philosophy in methods of pre-Kant. In Plechanow’s works published in 1915 he classified Julien Offroy de la Mettrie, Denis Diderot, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels into ‘Spinoza’s species’, asserting their materialist essences are all the same. In addition, he claimed Marx and Engels always held the same viewpoint as Feuerbach on so-called ‘issues of philosophy itself’ and Marx’s knowledge theory was, in reality, Feuerbach’s knowledge theory.[1] Mehring put it much more concisely: ‘Mechanical materialism is, in the area of science, principle of scientific researches and so is historical materialism in the area of social sciences.’ Besides, he added, historical materialism should not be separated from or made opposite to materialism of natural sciences and they should coexist. The former is simply supplementary to the latter, and the representative of the latter is Feuerbach.[2] As a result, the difference seems only to be related to the division of academic areas and since a philosopher is not able to carry out two (or more) kinds of different ontological foundations in various fields, here it is inevitable to classify Marx as Feuerbach. It is necessary to point out, this kind of classifications does not end at Feuerbach at all: partly due to the driving of logic itself, partly because of Feuerbach’s rapid retreat when he faced the limitation of himself. Here we are in fact confronted with the withdrawal to pre-Kant ontological foundation.
Admittedly among theorists of Second International, the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy was interpreted as Feuerbach’s and then pre-Kant. Under such conditions, it is not surprising to see that the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy was compared to materialism in 18th century, even mixed with Hobbes’. By the way, ‘the theory of economic determination’ claimed by theorists of Second International, their compromises and retreats in front of positivism and leaving the room for subjectivism, especially the theory of will, etc. are all the results of presuming and understanding ‘the foundation’ in this way--- some are more recent results and some are remote ones. As for various ‘attachments’ and ‘supplements’ mentioned above, it does not matter at all because before the foundation itself changes in principle those input and introduced remain in the accidentalness and outside of the foundation instead of becoming part of the foundation. Just as an inductionist could sometimes talk about the leading function of theories under certain circumstances, when Mehring quoted Fichte, Schopenhauer or Lssalle，when Plechanow pointed out the great activity and dialectics of Hegel’s philosophy, their ontological foundation remained untouched because (and only because) those quotations and pointing out in this way can not become and has never become part of the foundation but only as external attachments and supplements. It is in that situation that there comes the counter-revolution of Lukács against ‘Mehring-Plechanow’s orthodox’.
The first thesis in Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach is the well-known and familiar one: ‘The chief defect of all previous materialisms---including Feuerbach’s --- is that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object or perception, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. As a result, idealism, contrary to materialism, developed the active aspect but only in the abstract because idealism, of course, does not know true realistic and sensuous activity itself.’[3]. In this passage, we should attach importance to such three questions: first, what are objective or directly perceived forms? And what is its nature? Second, how is it possible to understand from such a principle height as treating things, reality and perception as man’s sensuous activities, as practices from subjective aspects? Third, how should we understand ‘sensuous activity’ itself, or so-called ‘objectified [gegenstandliche] activities’?
Let’s take a look at first question. Viewed from philosophical ontology, so-called objective or directly perceived forms are, at first, Spinoza’s ‘entity’ whose nature is ‘the metaphysicized Nature separated from man’, so they are double abstractions---both the abstraction of the division (departure from its original connections )between the nature and man and the abstraction in metaphysicizing meaning. The double abstractions are therefore ‘the objective or directly perceived forms’ whose crucial points are ‘forms’, namely, the forms or concepts of thinking, the concept forms about the nature but not the nature itself. In a word, they are ‘the thinking results in the name of nature’ (Marx). Just in this sense, when Feuerbach began to develop his ‘sensuousness-objectification’ principle, he was absolutely right to call Spinoza the ‘chief criminal’ of modern metaphysics and to point out ‘the matter as matter’ is the same as ‘the notion as notion’. They are all considered as abstract concepts and thinking forms for Feuerbach ‘wants to study perceptual entity really different from thinking object’. It is in this meaning that we can safely include La Mettrie, D. Diderot and even Feuerbach himself (more exactly, the final result of his philosophy) into ‘Spinoza’s category’. But it is wrong if we include Marx into such a ‘category’. We will soon discuss the reasons in following section.
In two abstract meanings mentioned above, we can see ‘the matter as matter’ as the same category as ‘the notion as notion’. The modern form of ‘the notion as notion’ represented in Fichte’s ‘self-conscience’ is simply ‘metaphysicized man separated from the nature’ in character and then is also double abstraction meaning the abstract forms of subjects and activity. It is in this sense that Hegel considered Fichte’s ‘activity itself’ (and Kant’s ‘pure activity’) as self-principle ‘in subjective forms’ and their philosophies as ‘forms developed in themselves’, that is, ‘formal speculating inferences’. Here (where the sameness of both marks) what matters is the abstract form itself. Whether the form is objective and directly perceived or subjective and active is a secondary question. Therefore, Hegel determinedly requested realistic contents to remove abstractness of pure forms. This kind of contents connected with forms is ‘objective thought’. It is not only ‘our thinking’ but ‘thing itself (an sich)’ which does not ‘need to resort to foreign factors nor the objects of its objects. It provides nutrition for itself and it is the working object of itself.’[4]
The outcome of Hegel’s philosophy can be concluded as ‘the unification of metaphysicized man and the metaphysicized nature’ whose objective idea or absolute spirit is such unification. So Hegel did overcome some abstract forms in his own way and eliminate external oppositions between different forms. It is in this meaning that H. Gadamer said: ‘No one can better know than German idealism that conscience and its object are not two mutually separate worlds. German idealism even made up a term ‘philosophy’ of the same’ to explain the situation.’[5] However, it is very obvious that Hegel had only overcome one of double abstractions mentioned above, namely, the separation between entity and self-consciousness. He failed to overcome the abstraction of metaphysics itself. The overcoming of former abstraction to some extent is achieved even by depending on the further metaphysicization (so-called ‘successfully and fruitfully revived metaphysics of 17 century’). It is also in this meaning that Gadamer pointed out the threefold naiveness of German idealism, that is, the naiveness of conceptions, the naiveness of assertions and the naiveness of reflections. Furthermore, it is more important that further metaphysicizition (more exactly, the highest metaphysicizition) has only seemingly overcome the oppositions among forms and the abstraction itself of formalization, only moving the oppositions into the inside of theories, and has only claimed the mastering of the contents because the contents are still completely false. Just as pointed out by Marx, that Hegel’s ‘self-activity’ is abstract and only has ‘formal natures’ in reality. And because it is an abstract form without any contents, ‘its contents can only be formal contents produced after the abstraction of all contents. So it is a universal, abstract and suitable for any contents so that it is above all contents and suitable for all contents at the same time and it is an abstract form, a thinking form and logical category separated from realistic spirit and realistic nature.’[6]
So the result of Hegel’s philosophy is that his philosophy is the complement of metaphysics and it keeps and includes all other metaphysics in itself in the process of the complement. In this sense, Hegel’s philosophy is not one metaphysic but all metaphysics so that entities, as abstract forms, thinking forms and logic categories of realistic nature, are totally included in Hegel’s philosophy just the same as the abstract form of self-conscience. If it is the case, following Plechanow’s expression is right: German idealism is the truth of the materialism of 18 century. It is all the same, just as Feuerbach is eventually classified as a branch of Hegel’s philosophy, all old materialisms, considering their remaining in abstract metaphysical forms, are only parts of Hegel’s philosophy because ‘objective or directly perceived forms’, whether as ‘entities’ or as ‘being-in-itself’, are all fundamentally within the great synthesis of Hegel’s philosophy: just as the former is negated as ‘entity as subject’, the latter is negated in ‘being in itself and for itself’. Hence so-called ‘forms’ here are not usually said appearances, methods or ways at all and can not change a little by means of external attachments and supplements. It is due to this point that Marx said the approach of ‘abstract substance’ is the approach of idealism, and even said ‘matter’ can only be an equivalent of ‘self-consciousness’ for they can only be kept in mutual, external or internal oppositions so matter ‘is only abstract or abstract matter but realistic matter.’[7] All those are based on the ontological foundation.
Accordingly, ‘objective or directly perceived forms’ are opposite to ‘self- consciousness’, namely, Kant’s (and Fichte’s) principle--- subjective or active forms, on the one hand, and constitute a negated link in Hegel’s philosophy on the other hand. Under former conditions, both theories share same ontological premises and keep their external oppositions. In the latter situation, each theory has synthesized the oppositions into the internal part of the theory in completed metaphysics and disclosed the true nature of its own. So as we have proved above, to Marx, the outlet cannot fundamentally sought by way of returning to pre-Kant’s standpoint because such a standpoint can only be a segment of Hegel’s philosophy at best, a type of more or less naive metaphysics. As for the landmark between pre-Kant and post-Kant, we can find it out with a simple question: Is our objective world given to us or constituted through out active participations? Here what is really important is that, to Marx, only by completely passing Kant and fundamentally transcending Hegel, can he find a forward road. Nevertheless, how is it possible?
2. Is the ontological foundation of
Marx’s philosophy in the approach of knowledge theory or in the approach of
theory of being?
This title is still distinguished on the basis of philosophical fundamental nature other than on the basis of subject branches or categories though the reminding function of branch and category division still exists to some extent. Since modern time, the knowledge theory, as an important philosophical fort, seems to have made up main ‘atmosphere’ and basic manor for philosophical research. Furthermore, when it declares its independence and fully unfolds itself, we can notice a leading approach factually constituting the modern ontological foundation which is displayed more clearly in German classical philosophy---not only as the closeness and overlapping among the research areas of the knowledge theory and ontology but as the identicalness of their natures. Besides, when this approach eventually reaches its complement (like the ‘absolute knowledge’ in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind). The approach of knowledge theory appears to be a principle, an axle and a ‘light illuminating all things’, and it nearly covers the entire history of western philosophy starting from Socrates and Plato. In this scope, though it is possible there may be partial exceptions, deviations or ‘deserting and fleeing’, the approach or principle of knowledge theory still extends to the remotest edge of philosophical thinking so soundly and forcefully that we can say it seems to be the only existing way of Western philosophy, to be the only way to constitute metaphysics (especially ontology). Accordingly, if the entire Western philosophy until Hegel can be suitably called Platonism, the philosophy in the approach of knowledge theory is nearly the synonym of Platonism.
However, the appearing and being realized of the approach of knowledge theory depends on that it must accomplish itself first and then display and mark its boundary in the accomplishment just like Hume dealing with the principle of experience theory. The man who accomplished the approach and revealed its boundary is none other than Hegel as, in fact, the accomplishment of metaphysics and the highest phase of the construction of the approach of knowledge theory are mere the same thing. Heidegger ever said, it is too early that metaphysics has occupied language essence. Here he means the decisive development of the approach of knowledge theory, its priority and controlling power and its understood being deprived and overstepped where its limitation appears. It is said above that Hegel’s philosophy is not only one of metaphysics but all of metaphysics. Here ‘all’, of course, means all links and accomplishment of the approach of knowledge theory. As a consequence, really exceeding Hegel means a revolution to end entire Platonism and all metaphysical foundation, and means to change approach completely, ‘to adopt a new way’. Or else, every ‘departure’ from or ‘rebellion’ against metaphysics has to return to metaphysics ultimately. Though any criticism and refutation in the approach of knowledge theory makes sense, it in fact consolidates metaphysical foundation rather than disintegrate it in the final analysis.
Now the question is what the approach of knowledge theory is? What is the approach of ontology? Where is the departing place between them? It is hard to give a definite answer to the question because it is difficult to give out a definition --- giving definition is the way in the approach of knowledge theory. It is wrong that Lukács ever thought he could easily overthrow irrationalist viewpoints for they could not reach a definite agreement on some basic questions. However it is reasonable in the approach of knowledge theory. Nevertheless, we should still give out a precise essential description to reveal the various differences between both of them: the nature of the approach of knowledge theory is conceptive, logical and reflective while the principle of the approach of ontology requires itself to be pre-conceptive, pre-logical and pre-reflective.
Since conceptive, logical and reflective ways are mainly considered as rational, some pioneers in the approach of ontology used to take the way of irrationalism or anti-rationalism in early time. Here it is enough we only list Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as examples. Anyhow it is because of this kind of ‘non-’ or ‘anti-’ that makes them put forwards ideas on the one hand and confirm the independent being of other side on the other hand in the extremes of oppositions and return to the same foundation. In the same situation, just as Heidegger pointed out Nietzsche was a metaphysician in the end, Sartre put Kierkegaard into the category of Hegelian philosophy. So in its real meaning, the approach of ontology based on itself does not try to cancel or oppose conceptive, logical and reflective principles but to demand to go down to more fundamental roots, to disclose the original places which make possible the establishment and development of the approach of knowledge theory and its interior oppositions, or just as what Gadamer has said, to demand to remove all naivety from the approach of knowledge theory. In this respect, what Barrett has said is roughly correct: ‘But irrationalism yields thinking domains to rationalism and reticently shares the presumption with its opponent in the debate. A more primary thinking is needed to eradicate the roots of both opposite sides.’[8] Heidegger ever claimed only if when we have eventually realized that ration has become the most stubborn enemy to thought can we begin to think but this does not mean to refuse to think but to demand to learn to think--- to think much more deeply than rationalists.
In the criticism of Hegel philosophy, Feuerbach did realize the limit and disability of the approach of knowledge theory for what it can really reach and command are only ‘objects in thought’ rather than ‘objects of perception’ different from the former. When Feuerbach made immediate affirmation against Hegel’s negation of negation (absolute affirmation), the directness of the perceived directly and perceptions against the medium process (abstract inference) of conception and ration, what he hoped was to reach, in the way of ontology, the area where the entire approach of knowledge theory had not really reached. It is the area which ever prepared the foundation for metaphysics in advance but was obscured by metaphysics. It is in the meaning of the division of different approaches that Feuerbach ever talked about ‘to us, the reality of perceptual and individual existence is a truth which needs to be guaranteed with the stamp made with our blood.’[9] He also talked about the ‘perceptual consciousness’, and even talked about ‘the pain of entity’: only the entity feeling pain is the essential entity while the entity without pain is an entity without sense and substance and thus an entity without any base and entity itself.[10] This is a way totally different from the approach of knowledge theory. Nonetheless, partly because Feuerbach opposed the approach of knowledge theory with the way of beautiful literature, and partly because his original approach of ontology was surrounded by various incompleteness and failed to become internal solid approach, he began to make a retreat In big strides whether in the position of ontology or in the way of construction. Marx pitifully said, Feuerbach was a ‘theorist’ and ‘philosopher’ after all.[11] It is obvious this saying is concerned about Feuerbach’s not going further and returning to metaphysics and the approach of knowledge theory ultimately. It is evident only to take a look at what Feuerbach has said as ‘category’, ‘human individuals’ and ‘the sense of category’, etc.
One of the enormous and remarkable areas in modern philosophy is the knowledge theory. It has integrated the approach of knowledge theory, as a principle with long history, into the entire philosophy in its fruitful development, and continually disclosed the build-in irremovable limitations and obstacles of its own in its whole unfolding process although actually the real problems deeply hides in the ontological foundation of modern knowledge theory. Descartes’ dualism had to resort to ‘the theory of god assistance’ to seek overcoming it and this state of affairs had not changed in the entire modern philosophy just as Holderlin said, ‘it remains as how it begins.’ The ultimate fruits of rationalism and empiricism had not changed this basic state so that Kant acutely complained: up to now no one could produce a convincing demonstration for ‘the Dasein of things outside us’, which is ‘a shame of philosophy and human reason’. However Kant himself did not sort out the problem, too. Perhaps Hegel is the very philosopher who did provide the highest and best solution to this problem in modern time but when it is finally recognized that he did so only still within the theme of ‘thought, of course, can understands itself as things themselves’ this kind of solution is viewed as false. Consequently Feuerbach claimed: ‘the philosophy of the same’ had not set up the unification of though and being at all and what Hegel did is only to destroy the unification. Similarly Marx again and again referred to Hegel’s philosophy as ‘dualism’ though this dualism is hidden and kept in the interior of the theory. Not until 1907, did Husserl again explicate the point of the problem and difficulty: ‘immanence itself is undoubted. It is understandable how immanence can be understood just as it is not understandable how transcendence can be understood.’[12]
Indeed, such problems and difficulty are insoluble in the range of modern philosophy (more exactly, in Platonist tradition) at all because such philosophy is limited to metaphysics and its approach of knowledge theory. When Marx said, ‘philosophers only explain the world with different ways but the problem is how to change the world.’[13], his meaning first of all lies in determinately exceeding the approach of knowledge theory, namely determinately exceeding the world dominated and ruled by conceptions, logic and reflections. Marx, in his Paris Manuscripts, ever talked about many oppositions established by metaphysics, and said: ‘The solution to this kind of problems is by no means a task of knowledge but a task of real life. Philosophy has not solved the problem because philosophy treats it only as a task of theory.’[14] The limitation mentioned here, a pure ‘task of theory’ or ‘task of knowledge’, the ‘to explain the world’ mentioned formerly and its fundamental deviation in philosophy are all the inevitable results of limiting to the approach of knowledge theory. The central problem here is how to transcend the approach of knowledge theory really but not ‘to add’ a meaning of real life within it scope to it or ‘to attach’ a practical function to it for such kind of ‘addition’ and ‘attachment’, just as we have mentioned above, does not dissolve but strengthen the foothold of metaphysics. Traditional philosophy also talked about ‘practice’ and also distinguishes ‘theory’ from ‘practice’ but the distinguishing itself is still ‘theoretical’, that is, in the approach of knowledge theory just as the ‘practice’ discussed by it is still a concept, a notion or a stipulation of reflection. Plechanow criticized Marx that he misunderstood Feuerbach. His reason was that Feuerbach understood ‘life’ and ‘practice’ (indeed, Feuerbach did not use these two words less than Marx.) In saying so, Plechanow did just draw Marx’s ‘practice’ onto the retreat road in the approach of knowledge theory. In fact, this kind of understanding Marx is not in the minority, even including Heidegger. Although there are differences in their positions and approaches, they all talked about, on the theory of ontology, Marx as a ‘theorist’ and ‘philosopher’ in Feuerbach’s meaning.
However, if we want determinately to exceed the approach of knowledge theory there should be two steps in philosophy: first, most resolutely eliminate the appearance of independence of knowledge theory itself and include the entire question area into the foundation of ontology. Second, disclose and reveal the fundamental oppositions and limitations of all metaphysics in Hegel philosophy, the complete form of the ontological foundation of the approach of knowledge theory so that we can fully reform and rebuild the foundation itself. The approach of the reform and rebuilding then belong to ontology, which means and demands to deepen into the world of pre-conception, pre-logic and pre-reflections. In contemporary philosophy with principle height, so-called ‘life world’ means such a world and so-called ‘linguistic turning’ exhibits primary characteristics of ontological nature of this world. In fact, above two steps are only two aspects of one process and we divide them just for the convenience of formulation. We can see, those two steps have determinately started in Marx’s theory and it is due to this point that we can understand the principle height and the complete meaning of Marx’s revolution based on the foundation of ontology and his ending all metaphysics. In his German Ideology, Marx wrote: ‘consciousness is only realized existence at any time, and people’s existences are their actual life processes.’[15] It is obvious that here the questions of knowledge theory are questions on the foundation of ontology for consciousness is summed up as ‘realized existence’. Heidegger did express the same idea: ‘knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world.’[16] And ‘knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world’.[17] Besides, Scheler ever pointed out, knowing is not a activity of judging but ‘a relation of Being’. As for man’s ‘real life processes’ as ‘Being’ itself, it is obvious that they can not been really touched and grasped in Marx’s thought through the approach of knowledge theory because (and only because) this world is pre-conceptive, pre-logical and pre-reflective. As for the description of the character of this approach, there are many of them high and low in German Ideology. The question is whether we can recognize them or not.
Therefore, only by completely passing Kant, exceeding Hegel and thoroughly evading Feuerbach’s retreat way, can we understand things, reality and perception as man’s perceptual activity, as practice and from subjective aspect. Furthermore, only through the approach of ontology exceeding the approach of knowledge theory is it possible. The practice as ‘perceptual activity’ and ‘objective activity’ is outside the vision of all old philosophies and is incomprehensible to them. The reason of the incomprehensibility is not because they could not know ‘perception’, ‘activity’ or the combination of both of them but that they completely fell into the approach of knowledge theory. We know, just as German classic philosophy fully developed ‘activity’ principle, empiricists and materialist sensationalists thoroughly developed ‘perception’ principle. So in the sphere of old philosophy, it is totally possible to ‘synthesize’ both of them despite troublesomeness. However, the real question is that ‘perception --- activity’ said by Marx is completely of different nature. This different nature can only be reached through the approach of ontology. Then, how should we understand this?
3. Does the ontological foundation of
Marx philosophy belongs to ‘subjective nature’ of ‘subjects’ or ‘the subjective
nature of objective essential force’?
If we say the revolution initiated by Marx on the ontological foundation put an end to the entire Platonism or entire metaphysics, making philosophical thinking completely change approaches and determinately opened the ontological approach, then the nature of the revolution as a whose should be tightly grasped so that we can scrupulously and thoroughly make out the principle boundary between it and traditional philosophy with same philosophical terms pointing to same things. Just as we can not understand Kant’s so-called ‘pure synthetic unity’ as a psychological concept, just as Kant’s so-called ‘object’ is different from all the concepts of object before him, the concepts ‘sensation’ and ‘passion’ in Marx’s Paris Manuscripts are not only narrow anthropological stipulations but should be understood as really ontological essential stipulations. It is impossible to discuss this in detail here. Nonetheless it is necessary to point out the distinguishing in principle height is absolutely necessary because any confusion happened on the approach may turn out to be a degenerate road from reliable understanding. Of course, the reason of this kind of degenerate understanding is not of knowledge theory just as the distinguishing we demand is not of knowledge theory but of hermeneutics.
We cannot get a real account for Marx’s ‘perceptual activity’ in terms of the concepts ‘perception’, ‘activity’ in modern philosophy or generally combining both of them although there is a reminding function of these two principles to some extent. The meaning of the ‘perceptual activity’ exceeding the approach of knowledge theory lies in that what it had opened and disclosed is the pre-conceptive, pre-logical and pre-reflective world, namely the original world which makes possible all natures on the surface of the approach of knowledge theory. In order to more closely understand ‘perceptual activity’ and its main approach on the foundation of ontology, we have to refer to another term, ‘objective activity [gegenstandliche]’ which Marx nearly repeated again and again in the same meaning (and often replaced one with the other). The range of the meaning and indicating of ‘Objectivity’ can be very extensive, and it even can be used to mark the basic character of the entire modern philosophy (say, Heidegger’s ever indicated this). But Marx’s use of the word is far beyond the range and the meaning is quite the opposite. (Feuerbach’s account for objectivity is a little special. It mainly includes two points: (1) Subjects become naught without objects; (2) The object necessarily having essential relations with a subject is none other than the built-in and objective essence of the subject. Such explanation is above all against Hegel’s ‘absolute subject’, and an attempt to transcend the vision of modern philosophy and to reach the original connection between man and the nature. This kind of propositions, however, still remains in abstract forms and the nature of present-at-hand of the approach of knowledge theory so it can not really disclose the original connection.)
We should point out, to Marx, the ‘object’ and its ‘objectivity’ set up by modern philosophy, whether the objectivity is the objectivity of present-at-hand object, a concept before Kant or the objectivity constituting object, a notion started by Kant, are not only dubious but rootless. As a result, what Hegel did after he had completed modern philosophy was to sublate ‘the objectivity itself’, that is, thoroughly to overcome the object of consciousness--- for object itself is something disappearing to consciousness. The reason why the objectivity constructed in modern range is doubtful and rootless is that the oppositions like subject and object, being and thought, consciousness and object, etc. are fundamentally insoluble on the approach of knowledge theory. ‘The scandal of human reason’ said by Kant and ‘the incomprehensibility of exceeding knowledge’ related by Husserl are all from the fundamental problem concluded by Heidegger, that is, “how this knowing subject comes out of its inner ‘sphere’ into one which is ‘other and external’, of how knowing can have any object at all, and of how one must think of the object itself so that eventually the subject knows it without needing to venture a leap into another sphere…how knowing makes its way ‘out of’ ‘inner sphere’ and achieves ‘transcendence’?”[18]
In order to solve this fundamental problem, we must escape from metaphysics and its approach of knowledge theory because this problem is just produced and strengthened by philosophy in the approach. Here the nuclear problem is the opposition between the ‘inner’ and the ‘transcendence’. The only way to remove the ‘sorcery’ is to go beyond the problem itself and firmly grasp the original connection between man and the nature by means of ontology. This original connection, in a sense, can be compared with Heidegger’s ‘the primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world’.[19] Marx ever wrote, the important question, the relation of man to the nature, has always considered as a sort of profound philosophical question: “This is a question giving rise to the thinking of ‘unfathomable creators’ such as ‘entity’ and ‘self-consciousness’”; however, if we have caught ‘unification of man and the nature’ understood in ‘industry’, the above question will naturally no longer exist.[20] Here are two points as following: first, the ‘unification between man and the nature’ revealed by Marx is not (and is impossible to be) the relationship of ‘man to the nature’ in the approach of knowledge theory (because any such relation in this approach is simply various modes of the relation of ‘entity’ to ‘self-consciousness’) but the original connection between man and the nature. Second, Marx’s disclosure itself is not to change the form of the question and to answer it in the approach of knowledge theory in the metaphysical area but to put an end to the question itself so that it really opens a brand-new horizon extending into ‘thing itself’. The ‘objective activity’ which we have specially emphasized is just the opening in philosophical depth and it is due to such opening that it reveals fundamental differences between itself and former so-called ‘objectivity’ and ‘activity’ in principle.
In the range of modern philosophy, the ontological foundation of ‘objectivity’ is so weak that its transcendence (namely, outside ‘the inner’) always means that object is an area never really accessible or can be only illegally accessible to consciousness (even Kant’s very important reform is helpless to this) when the foundation is not totally covered. As a result, in the complete form of modern philosophy, subject has no choice but become an absolute subject so that it sublates objectivity itself logically. What is the meaning of such sublation of objectivity? It means, actually to eliminate objective world and make the world disappear as to the extent as it makes consciousness (as knowledge of knowledge and thinking of thinking) ‘directly disguise itself as others different from itself, as perception, reality and life.’[21] Furthermore, it means that subject becomes non-objective and ‘existence of Spititualism’[22]. Consequently to Marx the problem is not to save objectivity itself but comprehend and re-establish objective relationship in the way of completely exceeding the approach of knowledge theory. The essence of the objective relationship is to disclose the original connection between man and the nature. Such task, of course, can not be realized through returning to any former concept of object because they are always limited to metaphysics in the approach of knowledge theory and share the great premise whose message was finally betrayed by Hegel’s philosophy, that is, they essentially rely on the dismissal, split and cover of above ‘original connection’ as foundation and foothold. To the contrary, Marx’s ‘objectivity’ is above all to disclose and present such kind of original connection. We can not expound this point in detail in this paper and only are contented to give out a few key points on the ontological foundation as following.
First, about the existence of existent things, Marx said, a existent thing is not objective existent thing if it has no object outside itself. In other words, it has no ‘objective relationship’ and then its existence is not objective existence. The ‘objective relationship’ mentioned here represents the original connection between man and the nature but is not any relation between subject and object (no matter what kind of forms in which it is expressed is) in metaphysical linguistic environment. Then what are non-objective existent things? They can be only an ‘unrealistic, non-perceptive and existing in thought or fabricated existent things.’[23] And it can be more precisely expressed as ‘non-objective existing things are non-existing things’.[24] Obviously in this more generally meaning, the existence of existing things is the objective relationship itself because we could not talk about any existing things (they can only be non-existing things no matter what they may be called) without this kind of objective relationship as original connection. So when we talk about the existence of any existing things the objective relation as original connection has already been disclosed in advance.
Second, as for ‘the nature and man exist through themselves’, Marx ever especially wrote, if someone puts forward the question of the creation of the nature and man he is just abstracting man and the nature from the reality: ‘You assume they do not exist and then’ hope me to show you they are existing.’[25] This is a significant but often omitted question. The importance of the question lies in that it reveals a kind of actuality: all kinds of metaphysics (especially modern philosophy) confined to the approach of knowledge theory are ultimately engaging in this kind of abstraction and asking the proof of their existence (or one of them) on the premises of assuming their non-existence. Just as Heidegger said, “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof had yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and ‘outside’ of it a ‘world’ is to be proved as present-at-hand. …If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it.”[26] Indeed, the demand for such kind of proof is impossible to end before the original connection between man and the nature is really comprehended. When Marx pointed out the new horizon he cautioned people, do not think or ask questions to me in this way for it is meaningless to abstract man and the nature from reality.[27]
Third, as for the reality of man and the nature. The reality mentioned here is, of course, ‘the existence of man and the nature through themselves’. Now that the real existence can only be the existence of objectification, the existence of the nature and man through themselves is originally the existence of their objectification and the original connection into which they retire. Here we have no definition of reality in traditional forms. On the contrary, only when we neglect or dismiss the original connection can the definition be possible. Just as man’s reality does not rely on man’s nature based on the quality of knowledge theory, material’s reality does not come from the material nature of material of the same quality or such kind of metaphysical objective realities. They are and only are ‘Spirit far from the reality and abstract forms, thinking forms and logical notions of the real nature’[28] just like what Marx said. Only through the objectification relationship as the most general and only real origin, namely through the original connection between man and the nature, can we historically disclose the reality consistently remaining in objectification. Therefore if we talk about the nature or man’s reality, both of them (more exactly, the original connection of them) should be mentioned together, and we can deal with the one without the other. Marx determinately expressed this point as following: the reality of man and the nature is ‘human existence as the nature, to man and the natural existence as man, to man’, and in the same sense, ‘the abstractly and independently understood nature fixed as far from man is nothing to man.’[29] Marx’s exposition about the relationship of objectification can not be understood from the approach of knowledge theory and by no means considered as a preference for radical words. On the contrary it should be comprehended more closely and deeply. Marx often had such kind of expositions, such as human existence as nature and the natural existence as man, or human essence of nature and the natural essence of man. Besides, completed naturalism equals humanism and completed humanism equals naturalism; and the direct sensuous nature ‘is directly a man of sensuous existence to him.’[30], etc. The purpose of all these expressions is none other than dissolving all essences and realities metaphysicified in the approach of knowledge theory and bringing more original roots to the light. It is unnecessary to blame these expressions for ‘contradictions’ and ‘recycles’ because they are not limited to the basic methods of the approach of knowledge theory from the start and the ontological exposition originally contains that kind of hermeneutic recycles inherent in living structure itself.
Finally, the existence of objectification is directly the activity of objectification. ‘When real man of flesh and blood, standing on the solid earth and breathing in and out all the powers of nature, defines, through his externalization, his real, objectified essential forces as objects alienated from himself, this definition is by no means a subject; it is the subjectivity of objectified essential forces and so the activity of the essential forces must be the activity of objectification. Objectified existence objectively [objectifiedly] practices and so long as there is not things of objectification in its definition it can not objectively practice…it is not true that it turns to create its object from ‘pure activity’ in the action of definition but the products of its objectification just confirm its activity of objectification and confirm that its activity is the activity of objectification and natural existing things.’[31] Evidently when the existence of objectification is understood in this way as activity of objectification, so-called subjectivity is completely digested and absorbed in the brand-new vision of ontology. As evidently as that, this ‘subjectivity’ is by no means anything that can be understood to the philosophy in the approach of knowledge theory. For that reason Marx drew a strict line between ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ to prevent to account for the ‘subjectivity’ of objectified essential forces from the concept ‘subject’ in any modern way. The last sentence in above quotation has fundamentally indicated the principle difference of determinate meaning on the foundation of ontology but the difference, however, is nearly completely forgotten. So in previous explanations of Marx philosophy, its ‘subjectivity’ is still often defined according to ‘subject’ just as its ‘object’ often needs a supplement of the subjectivity of subject. Just as what Heidegger said in an analogy, the foundation of this kind of dual oppositions is like a subject enclosed in a ‘secret room’ which starts a long conquering journey from its inner and then brings back games to the ‘secret room’ of consciousness. Only by really transcending such subjectivity of subject (just as to exceed modern so-called objectification of object to the same extent), can the thorough revolution on the foundation brought about by Marx be correctly understood and evaluated just as only in this way can we be confronted with the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy.
In conclusion, ‘Sensuous activity’ or ‘objectified (gegenstandliche) activity’ is the pivot of the ontological foundation of Marx’s philosophy and therefore constituting a brand-new horizon of philosophical revolution to end all metaphysics. This paper is only an introduction, a prelude to further studies and expositions.
[1] Here so-called ‘knowledge theory’ means the ontological foundation of theory of knowledge. See Plechanow, Selected Philosophical Works of Plechanow, volume iii, p778-780, (Shanlian,1959).
[2] See Mehring: Guard Marx, p99,146, (People’s, 1982). Marks of emphasis are added by the writer of this article.
[3] Selected works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1, p16, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1972
[4] Hegel: Philosophy of History,p47, Shanlian Bookstore, 1956.
[5] Gadamer: Philosophical Hermeneutics, p118, Shanghai Yiweng Publishing House, 1994.
[6] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p176 People’s Publishing House, 1979.
[7] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p128 People’s Publishing House, 1979
[8] Barrett: Irrationalist Man, p218, Shanghai Yiweng Publishing House, 1992.
[9] Selected works of Feuerbach, Volume 1, p68, Shangwu Printing House, 1984.
[10] Selected works of Feuerbach, Volume 1, p110, Shangwu Printing House, 1984.
[11] Selected works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1, p47.
[12] Husserl: Conception of Phenomenology, p72, Shanghai Yiweng Publishing House, 1986.
[13] Selected works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1, p19.
[14] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p127.
[15] Selected works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1, p30. Mark of emphasis is added by the writer of the paper.
[16] Heidegger: Being and Time, p75,Shanlian Bookstore, 1987.
[17] Heidegger: Being and Time, p78,Shanlian Bookstore, 1987.
[18] Heidegger: Being and Time, p75,Shanlian Bookstore, 1987.
[19] Heidegger: Being and Time, p249,Shanlian Bookstore, 1987.
[20] Selected works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1, p49.
[21] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p171.
[22] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p164.
[23] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p168.
[24] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p168.
[25] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p130.
[26] Heidegger: Being and Time, p247-248, Shanlian Bookstore, 1987.
[27] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p130-131.
[28] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p176.
[29] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p178.
[30] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p129.
[31] Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 42, p167.